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Under which circumstances do governments in intergovernmental negotiations in the EU 
resort to hard bargaining and when do they opt for soft tactics instead? We present a 
series  of  hypotheses  that  try  to  respond  to  this  question.  These  hypotheses  suggest
variation in the choice of negotiation tactics across countries. A very preliminary analysis 
of the negotiations concerning the EU’s multi-annual financial framework for the period 
2007-2013, which lasted from 2003 until 2006, allows us to examine the plausibility of 
these  hypotheses.  Future  research  along  the  lines  set  out  in  this  paper  is  likely  to 
contribute  to  the  literature  on  international  negotiations,  which  so  far  has  given  little 
attention to the determinants of negotiation strategies. The research also has the potential 
to shed new light on the internal workings of the European Council, an increasingly 
important negotiating forum in the EU.
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1 Introduction
Under  which  circumstances  do  governments  resort  to  hard  bargaining in 
intergovernmental negotiations and when do they opt for softer tactics instead?
1 And, are 
strategies purely determined by the negotiation context or is there systematic variation 
with respect to the choice of tactics across individual governments? Very little empirical 
research  has  been  carried  out  on  these  questions  so  far  (Odell  2002).  Indeed,  few 
hypotheses  have  been  put  forward  that  could  be  tested  empirically,  since  most 
publications dealing with negotiation tactics are of a prescriptive nature (see for example, 
Raiffa 1982; Fisher and Ury 1981). The stated purpose of these publications is to teach 
negotiators to negotiate effectively – either to maximize common or individual gains –
rather than to assess what tactics negotiators actually use and why.
We start filling this gap in the literature with a study of negotiation tactics in 
intergovernmental negotiations in the European Union (EU). In particular, we focus our 
research on the negotiations concerning the EU’s multi-annual financial framework for 
the period 2007-2013 (called Financial Perspective), which started in 2003 and which 
were concluded at the end of 2006. A multi-annual financial framework establishes the 
amount to be paid by each individual member state, and the allocation of EU funds to 
broad policy areas. This case appears propitious for our purpose for two main reasons.
First, we are interested in intergovernmental negotiations, and the budget negotiations 
come close to this ideal type – at least the intergovernmental part of the negotiations that 
lasts  from  the  presentation  of  a  proposal  by  the  European  Commission  (in  this  case, 
1 This paper is part of a project entitled “Ireland and ‘Grand Bargains’ in the EU”, financed by the Irish 
Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences (Government of Ireland Thematic Project Grants 
2006/2007).2
February 2004) until a decision is reached by the heads of state or government in the 
European  Council  (in  this  case,  December  2005).  Second,  the  intergovernmental 
negotiations for the Financial Perspective 2007-2013 extended over a substantial period 
of time, making it easier systematically to study negotiation tactics. 
This  research  is  highly  relevant  for  three  reasons.  First,  negotiations  are 
ubiquitous in the EU (Wallace 1996: 32; Moravcsik 1998). Nevertheless, so far only 
relatively few studies have explicitly analyzed negotiation processes in the EU (for some 
exceptions,  see  Elgström  and  Jönsson  2000;  Niemann  2004).  A  study  of 
intergovernmental negotiations in the EU, therefore, should be of interest to scholars of 
European integration. Second, the research should make a contribution to the literature on 
international  negotiations.  In  particular,  although  previous  research  has  distinguished 
among different negotiation tactics (Odell 2002), little is known about the determinants of 
the choice of tactics. This is astonishing given that the choice of tactics may have an 
influence on negotiation outcomes. Power and interests are evidently the main variables 
explaining negotiation outcomes. Nevertheless, it seems likely that the impact of these 
two  variables  on  outcomes  is  mediated  by  the  strategies  followed  by  actors  in  the 
negotiations (Habeeb 1988; Odell 2000; Elms 2005). The study of negotiation tactics that 
we propose in this paper may help set the stage for an examination of this link. Finally, so 
far  few  studies  have  analysed  the  empirical  case  of  the  negotiations  for  the  EU’s 
Financial  Perspective  2007-2013,  or  any  negotiations  for  a  multi-annual  financial 
framework for the EU (for exceptions, see Laffan 1997; Lindner 2006). Research that 
aims at filling this gap is particularly timely as member states will review the way in 
which they should approach future budget negotiations in 2008 and 2009.3
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  In  the  next  section,  we  provide  a  short 
overview of the negotiations concerning the Financial Perspective for 2007-2013 to set 
the stage for the analysis of negotiation tactics. In the third section of the paper, we list a 
series of tactics that can be used by negotiators, and distinguish them by whether they are 
an  indication  of  “hard  bargaining”  or  “soft  bargaining”.  We  then  present  a  series  of 
hypotheses that link actor characteristics, negotiation phases, and levels of negotiation 
with the choice of either of these two broad strategies. In the last part of the paper, we use 
four case studies to explore ways of how to examine the hypotheses presented. 
2 Background to the Negotiations over the Financial Perspective, 2007-2013
Negotiations over a multi-annual financial framework for the EU have to tackle three 
main questions: the overall amount that should be spent; where the money should come 
from; and what the money should be spent on (Begg 2005: 14). Of these three questions, 
the  last  is  the  most  controversial  one:  a  multi-annual  framework  establishes  annual 
ceilings for all major budget headings, and thus sets the agenda for European integration 
for several years. The negotiations are largely intergovernmental, with the key decisions 
being taken in the European Council among heads of state or government (Laffan and 
Lindner  2006:  196).  The  European  Commission  presents  the  initial  proposal,  but  the 
debate then shifts to the Council of Ministers, where the proposal is discussed in several 
working groups, with the Economic and Financial Affairs (EcoFin) and General Affairs 
and  External  Relations  councils  dominating  the  process.  At  the  end  of  this 
intergovernmental process, the European Council has to reach a unanimous decision on 
the framework. The final agreement, however, is only reached after a further negotiation 
process involving the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, and the European 4
Parliament,  which  results  in  an  inter-institutional  agreement  among  the  three  players
(Enderlein et al. 2005: 16).
The multi-annual financial framework for the period 2007-2013, the fourth in the 
history of the EU, was negotiated between 2003 and 2006. The process started in the 
European  Commission,  with  a  series  of  working  groups  discussing  the  main  issues 
between  April  and  July  2003.  In  February  2004,  the  Commission  presented  a  first 
proposal  for  the  framework,  which  foresaw  expenditures  of  1025  billion  Euro  (1.14 
percent of the EU’s Gross National Income, GNI). The Commission further specified its 
proposal in July of the same year, before the process shifted to the member state level. 
The  discussions  among  member  state  governments  took  off  under  the  Luxembourg 
Presidency in the first half of 2005,  with several questions shaping the debates: how 
much should be spent overall, with six net contributors to the EU budget demanding a 
reduction of the volume to no more than 1 percent of GNI; whether to scrap the British 
rebate, which reduced the Great Britain’s net contribution to the EU’s budget; whether to 
revise the decisions made with respect to spending on the Common Agricultural Policy in 
October 2002; and how much of the money should go to the new member states. The 
Luxembourg Presidency presented a compromise between conflicting positions in June 
2005, which had an overall volume of 872 billion Euro (1.05 percent of GNI) – 153
billion less than the Commission proposal (Ackrill and Kay 2006: 11).
2 The European 
Council of June 2005 failed to reach agreement on the basis of this proposal, however. 
The negotiations continued under the Presidency of Great Britain in the second 
half  of  2005.  Not  before  5  December  did  the  British  present  a  new  proposal,  which 
strongly  reflected  British  interests  in  maintaining  its  rebate.  The  British  Presidency 
2 The numbers given refer to appropriations for commitments. 5
revised its proposal once more in response to criticism from other countries, but only a 
German proposal finally allowed for a compromise in the European Council of December 
2005. This compromise  established  a  ceiling of €862 billion, or 1.045  of EU  GNI –
slightly higher than the two British proposals, but lower than the proposal presented by 
the Luxembourg presidency. The agreement reached by the member states, however, was 
rejected  by  the  European  Parliament  in  a  crushing  vote  (only  76  parliamentarians 
supported the agreement as concluded by the European Council) in January 2006. In mid-
May 2006, finally, the European Parliament accepted a revised agreement, leading to its 
signature on 17 May 2006.
3 A Typology of Negotiation Tactics
A negotiation strategy is a “set of behaviors”, and negotiation tactics are the “particular 
actions  that  make  up  a  strategy”  (Odell  2002:  40).  Existing  research  has  proposed 
different typologies of tactics in negotiations: distributive versus integrative bargaining
(Walton and McKersie 1965; Da Conceição-Heldt 2006), value claiming versus value 
creating  (Lax  and  Sebenius  1986;  Odell  2002),  bargaining  versus  problem  solving 
(Hopmann 1995; Elgström and Jönsson 2000), bargaining versus arguing (Müller 2004; 
Kotzian 2007), and strategic action versus communicative action (Niemann 2004). Some 
authors take these various distinctions to be congruous, that is, they assume that they all
capture  basically  the  same  basic  difference.  This  is  not  necessarily  correct,  however 
(Kersten  2001).  In  the  words  of  Elgström  and  Jönsson  (2000:  686),  “The  correlation 
between egoistic concerns and a conflictual approach, and between a common interest 
attitude and a problem-solving approach is less than perfect.”6
Rather than rely on these existing typologies, we make a distinction between two 
strategies: “hard bargaining” and “soft bargaining”.
3 Hard bargaining is characterized by 
conflictual  or  aggressive  tactics;  soft  bargaining  by  cooperative  or  friendly  ones.  By 
introducing  our  own  distinction,  we  avoid  some  problems  that  arise  when  using  the 
existing ones in an empirical study of negotiation strategies. In some distinctions, the 
intentions of the actors account for the main difference: are actors genuinely concerned 
with finding the “best” solution (communicative action) or do they strive for the best 
possible deal for themselves (strategic action)? And are they concerned with the common 
interest  (value  creating)  or  with  the  private  interest  (value  claiming)?  The  distinction 
between  integrative  and  distributive  bargaining  is  not  ideal,  either.  Tactics  used  in 
negotiations may at the same time be integrative (namely create value) and distributive 
(namely divide scarce resources). Under specific circumstances, even a threat – generally 
supposed to be a purely distributive tactic – may help to increase the pie that can be 
divided in a negotiation. Our distinction, by contrast, simply divides tactics depending on 
whether they are more or less conflictive (aggressive). Actors relying on soft bargaining 
tactics are not necessarily more concerned with the common interest than actors engaging 
in hard bargaining. This approach has the advantage that it allows us to move away from 
assumptions towards testable hypotheses about what drives the choice of tactics. 
A series of tactics characterize hard bargaining (for  similar lists of tactics, see 
Walton  and  McKersie  1965;  Odell  2002:  49-50).
4  First,  negotiators  may  enter  the 
3 Fisher and Ury (1981: 13) also distinguish between soft and hard bargaining. Their distinction, however, 
is  different  from  ours  in  that  they  assume  that  soft  bargaining  involves  accepting  one-sided  losses, 
disclosing the bottom line and changing one’s position easily. In our approach, we do not make any such 
assumptions.
4 We only list tactics that are observable – there are others such as concealing information that cannot be 
observed.7
negotiations  with  a  very  high  opening  demand,  which  clearly  exceeds  a  realistic 
expectation. This is a conflictual strategy as it signals to the other side an unwillingness 
to compromise. Second, actors can make a strong, public commitment of not giving in, or 
of not accepting the addition of an issue to the agenda of the negotiations that is dear to 
the other side. A pledge of not moving away from a position is a particularly aggressive 
tactic if this position represents a high demand. By stressing the “unalterable” nature of a 
demand, a negotiator communicates firmness rather than flexibility. The tactic increases 
the costs of making a concession, as this now also includes concerns about “losing face”. 
In intergovernmental negotiations, one way of making such a public commitment is to 
emphasize the “national interest” that is at stake. Third, a negotiator may criticize the 
other side. Such a “shaming” strategy may include demands that the other side moves 
first with respect to concessions.
Fourth, the creation of a defensive coalition is a hard bargaining tactic. Such a
coalition  is  aimed  at  blocking  a  compromise.  Finally,  the  most  aggressive  tactic
characterizing hard bargaining is a threat. A threat is “a message from Party announcing 
the intention to hurt Other if Other fails to comply with Party’s wishes” (Pruitt and Kim 
2004: 71). It signals to a recipient that the sender is willing to harm the latter, unless the 
latter abstains from or engages in specific action. Such a threat can be expressed more or 
less subtly: it can be an explicit threat with a veto in intergovernmental negotiations that 
require unanimity, or can come as part of a statement of the type: “We do not want to 
make use of our veto, but if necessary, be assured that we have the capacity to block an 
agreement”. Preparing for the implementation of an action that can harm the other side is 
at the most confrontational end of negotiation tactics.8
On the soft bargaining end, assuming from the beginning a flexible position that
stresses the common interest in reaching an agreement is a friendly strategy. Second, also 
during the negotiations negotiators may publicly signal flexibility, using statements such 
as:  “We  are  willing  to  make  further  concessions  if...”.  Third,  negotiators  may  make 
conciliatory  statements.  Such  a  conciliatory  statement  is  likely  to  stress  the  common 
interest in a negotiated outcome, and the preferences that one has in common with the 
other side. It may also involve praising the other side, and thus strengthening the other 
side’s position vis-à-vis domestic constituencies. Towards the end of a negotiation, a 
conciliatory statement may be made to help the other side save its face, for example, by 
defending publicly that the other side did not abandon a position, although this was the 
case. This tactic is also known as “cost cutting”, as it allows the other side to cut the costs 
of  making  a  concession  (Pruitt  1983:  168). Fourth,  a  friendly  strategy  in  multilateral 
negotiations  is  to  seek  partners  for  compromise.  This  tactic  may  involve  making  a 
proposal  and  then  meeting  with  a  reluctant  party  to  ask  it  to  accept  the  proposal. 
Alternatively, key players may make joint proposals for compromise. Finally, instead of 
threatening,  a  negotiating  party  may  make  a  proposal  for  compromise.  This  tactic 
includes  inventing  new  offers  (Fisher  and  Ury  1981:  41;  Kersten  2001)  and  making
several proposals, allowing the other party (parties) to voice a preference for one. It may 
also  encompass  a  proposal  for  the  addition  or  subtraction  of  issues  to  allow  for  a 
negotiated agreement. 9
In short, several tactics are associated with both hard and soft bargaining (see 
Table 1). Evidently, not always is the distinction between these tactics clear-cut. It may 
be particularly difficult to distinguish between high opening demands and more flexible 
proposals, and between friendly coalitions and defensive ones. Nevertheless, we hope 
that the distinctions are clear enough to try and tell them apart in empirical research. 
4 Explaining Variation in Negotiation Strategies
Whereas a huge literature deals with the question what negotiators should do, only few 
studies advance hypotheses with the aim of explaining why negotiators pick one tactic or 
another (for an exception, see Pruitt 1983). What is more, among the few studies that 
empirically  deal  with  strategies,  most  point  to  the  negotiation  context  (highly 
institutionalized or not) and the type of issue that is being negotiated (regulatory versus 
distributive)  as  shaping  negotiation  strategies  (Elgström  and  Jönsson  2000;  Da 
Conceição-Heldt 2006). Following this line of reasoning, Walton and McKersie (1965: 5) 
argue  that  integrative  and  distributive  bargaining  are  “rational  responses  to  different 
situations”. If the nature of a problem makes bargaining a zero-sum game, actors should 
adopt a distributive approach, while a problem that allows for solutions that can benefit 
all parties calls for integrative bargaining. Our approach is different in that we ask: do 
different actors use different tactics in the same negotiation context? And if yes, what 
Table 1: Typology of negotiation tactics
Hard bargaining Soft bargaining
High opening demand Flexible position, stressing common 
interest
Public commitment of not giving in Publicly signalling flexibility
Criticize other side Conciliatory statement
Defensive coalition Seek partners for compromise
Threat Proposal for compromise10
explains the variation that can be observed? We propose a set of hypotheses that link 
actor  characteristics,  the  phases  of  a negotiation,  and  the  levels  of  negotiation  to  the 
choice of strategies. 
H1:  “Large  countries,  which  dispose  of  more  power  resources,  should  rely  more  on 
aggressive tactics than small countries.”
We hypothesize that large countries that dispose of greater economic and political power 
resources should be more likely to rely on hard bargaining. Since hard bargaining can 
undermine relations between two or more parties (Lax and Sebenius 1986: 34), it should 
be used more frequently by actors who have less to lose from such a deterioration of 
relations. Basically, this applies to large countries because they dispose of ample power 
resources. Smaller countries, by contrast, opt for soft tactics as they may feel a need to 
“ingratiate” themselves with the larger countries (Pruitt 1983: 175). Countries with larger 
power resources should also be less vulnerable to the aggressive strategies that other 
countries may rely on in response; for example, if the recipient of a threat decides to 
counter-threaten  rather  than  comply.  Indeed,  the  existing  literature  on  the  choice  of 
negotiation tactics suggests that arguing – which can be viewed as a type of soft tactic –
is used by the weak. In the words of one author, “If an actor has no power resources to 
engage successfully in bargaining, bargaining will have little or no utility” (Kotzian 2007: 
85). Translated to the case of the EU’s budget negotiations, this hypothesis leads us to 
suspect that the large three (France, Germany, Great Britain) or four (including Italy) 
member countries of the EU should have relied more on hard bargaining than smaller 
member countries. 11
H2:  “The  better  the  alternative  to  negotiated  agreement  of  a  government,  the  more 
aggressive its strategy.”
If a negotiator is concerned only with issue specific repercussions, then issue-specific 
bargaining  power  –  the  best  alternative  to  negotiated  agreement  (BATNA)  –  may 
influence the choice of bargaining tactics. Again, the reason for this is that an actor with a 
good BATNA has little to lose from a breakdown of the negotiations, making threats and 
other  aggressive  moves  credible.  An  actor  may  be  reluctant  to  use  her  issue-specific 
power in that way, however, if – as in the EU – she has to engage in negotiations on other 
issues  with  the  same  parties.  Such  iterated  interaction  should  make  general  power 
resources more important than the issue-specific BATNA. Keeping this point in mind as 
an  alternative  hypothesis,  we  hypothesize  that in  the  case  of  the  negotiations  for  the 
Financial Perspective the net contributors should have been more willing to engage in 
hard bargaining than the net beneficiaries, which had a worse BATNA. In 2004, and 
using  operational  expenditures  only,  Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland,  France, 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom were 
net contributors to the EU budget (European Commission, DG Budget 2006: 138).
5 Four 
of these countries made particularly large net contributions (measured as percentage of 
GNI): Germany (0.32 percent), Italy (0.21 percent), the Netherlands (0.42 percent), and 
Sweden  (0.38  percent).  Following  this  hypothesis,  the  approach  taken  by  these  four 
countries  should  contrast  with  the  one  taken  by  the  new  member  countries,  which 
expected to become major net beneficiaries.
H3: “Countries that face losses tend to opt for more risky, that is, aggressive strategies.”
5 Belgium and Luxembourg were net recipients if administrative expenditures are included. 12
In a recent publication, Deborah Elms (2005) proposes the hypothesis that countries that 
face losses should opt for more conflictual negotiation tactics than countries that face 
gains. This hypothesis builds on prospect theory, which proposes that  losers (namely 
those that expect “that in the future they will be worse off than under the status quo”,
Elms 2005: 11) are more risk acceptant than winners. Aggressive strategies tend to be 
risky:  they  can  lead  to  substantial  gains,  but  also  to  substantial  losses.  As  the  risk 
acceptance of actors increases in the face of losses, consequently, these actors should 
exhibit  a  greater  willingness  to  use  hard  bargaining  tactics.  The  expectation  for  the 
negotiations on the EU’s financial framework is that France, Great Britain, Ireland and 
Spain,  which  faced  losses  as  a  result  of  the  negotiations  –  namely  with  respect to
agricultural payments, the British rebate, and structural funds respectively – should have 
employed more aggressive strategies than other member countries. 
H4: “The weaker the position of a government within a country, the more it will rely on 
hard bargaining tactics.”
Adopting  a  two-level  perspective,  one  can  also  hypothesize  that  domestically  weak 
governments should opt for conflictual tactics. Governments tend to be particularly weak 
if they face an election and if opinion polls for the party (parties) in power indicate losses 
in these elections. Whatever the reasons for its weaknesses, a feeble government will 
have to rely more on posturing than a strong government. Translating this reasoning to 
the case of the budget negotiations in the EU, the expectation is for governments that 
faced elections in 2005 and that expected to lose in these elections, should have relied on 
hard bargaining. There was a series of elections in EU member states in 2005: Denmark 
(8  February);  Portugal  (20  February);  United  Kingdom  (5  May);  Germany  (18 13
September);  and  Poland  (25  September).  In  three  of  those,  the  governments  were
expected to lose the elections. the Social Democratic Party in Portugal, the Democratic 
Left Alliance in Poland, and the Social Democratic Party in Germany were all in a weak 
position. We hypothesize that before the elections, the governments led by these parties 
should  have  been  more  likely  to  rely  on  hard  bargaining  than  governments  in  other 
member countries.
H5: “Governments of countries with populations that are euro-sceptic should be more 
willing  to  use  aggressive  bargaining  tactics  than  governments  with  pro-European 
populations.”
Equally, it seems plausible that governments that believe that their constituents favour 
them to exhibit toughness adopt hard bargaining tactics (Pruitt 1983: 184). Governments 
of  countries  with  a  euro-sceptic  population,  consequently,  should  rely  more  on  hard 
bargaining than governments with a generally pro-European population. In elections, the 
former are likely to gain more from a hard bargaining stance than the latter. They will 
draw an advantage from being seen as tough vis-à-vis Brussels and the EU in general. 
With  respect  to  the  negotiations  on  the  multi-annual  financial  framework,  the  Spring 
Eurobarometers for 2004 and 2005 allow us to assess the extent to which populations in 
different member states were Euro-sceptic (European Commission 2004, 2005). In 2004, 
among the old member states, the populations of Austria, Finland, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom  were  the  most  Euro-sceptical  ones  when  combining  the  responses  to  the 
questions on support for Union membership and benefits from EU membership. Among 
the new member states, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia and Poland turn out to be 
most Euro-sceptical. In 2005, little changed with respect to this selection of countries, 
with the exception that the Polish population became more Euro-friendly and Cyprus 14
moved up into the group of Euro-sceptical countries. An alternative measure of Euro-
scepticism could be the results of referendums on the Constitutional Treaty, with voters 
in France and the Netherlands rejecting the treaty in May and June 2005 respectively. 
Combining  these  measures,  we  take  Austria,  the  Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  Latvia, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom (and to a lesser extent Cyprus, France, the Netherlands, 
and Poland) to be the most Euro-sceptical countries. We expect the governments of these 
countries  to  adopt  more  hard  bargaining  tactics  than  the  governments  of  more  Euro-
friendly countries.
H6: “Old member states should be less willing to resort to hard bargaining than new 
member states.” 
Several factors suggest that the length of EU membership may influence the negotiating 
strategy of a country. First, friendly tactics may work particularly well if a country has 
sufficient expertise to make proposals for compromise. Such expertise will have to be 
acquired over time. Second, the length of membership may influence the degree to which 
officials are “socialized” into a specific EU culture (Lewis 1998). Intra-EU negotiations 
may be based on a specific “code of decency” (Kerremans 1996: 223), which may have 
to be learned first. At least for one country, this code reads: “[Do] not make enemies and 
ensure that you have a positive working relation with everyone” (Belgian official, quoted 
in Beyers 2005: 931). Such behavioural norms may develop over “many years of constant 
interaction” (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998: 10). New members, consequently, “might 
have  difficulties  in  adapting  to  the  ‘political  culture’  in  Brussels  where  compromise 
seeking  has  been  developed  into  an  art”  (Ungerer  1993:  82).  Indeed,  one  permanent 
representative of a member country stated: “Early in our membership we acted tough and 15
we had these positions, ‘Others don’t like it, too bad’” (quoted in Lewis 1998: 487). Over 
time,  EU  membership  may  then  condition “a  new  type  of  statal  intercourse”  (Weiler 
1992: 39). For the case of the negotiations over the Financial Perspective, the prediction 
is for the ten new member countries, which joined the EU in May 2004 (and hence in the 
middle  of  the  negotiations),  to  have  adopted  more  conflictual  tactics  than  the  older
member states. They should not yet have been accustomed to the EU’s “refined form of 
defending national interests” (Ungerer 1993: 82). 
H7: “In the early stages of a negotiation, soft bargaining should dominate; in the middle
stages, hard bargaining; and in the end game, again soft bargaining.”
The existing literature also includes some indications that the choice of strategy may vary 
across  phases  of  negotiations  (Niemann  2004).  One  expectation  is  for  soft  tactics  to 
dominate in the pre-negotiation phase, when preferences are still unclear and uncertainty 
prevails. The main part of the negotiations may then be characterized by more aggressive 
tactics, and the end game of the negotiations again by softer ones. Several reasons lead to 
the expectation of this pattern: in pre-negotiations, negotiators tend to have ample time 
and therefore may be more willing to engage in a soft approach. Later, when the deadline 
is more clearly visible, more conflictual tactics may be more attractive. It may also be 
that earlier phases of a negotiation are designed to allow actors to engage in “positive 
coordination”, leaving  “distributive bargaining”, which calls for hard bargaining, to a 
later stage (Scharpf 1997: 146). In the ultimate phase of a negotiation, the deadline is 
imminent,  making  the  finding of  a  solution  necessary,  which  in  turn  should  make 
negotiators more cautious in making threats or using other confrontational tactics. The 
expectation for the case of the negotiations over the Financial Perspective hence is for all 16
countries  to  have  adopted  soft  bargaining  tactics  during  2004  and  in  the  European 
Councils in June and December 2005, while engaging in hard bargaining throughout the 
rest of 2005.
H8: “Debates in lower level groups should be characterized by softer bargaining tactics 
than  ministerial-level  discussions.  Discussions  at  the  level  of  the  European  Council 
should also be characterized by soft bargaining.”
A  final  hypothesis  draws  attention  to  variation  in  the  bargaining  tactics  employed  at 
different levels of a negotiation. Negotiators at lower levels may interact with each other 
more frequently than negotiators at higher (ministerial) level (Lewis 1998). If interaction 
has a socialization effect, and this socialization effect makes actors adopt more friendly 
tactics,  than  soft  bargaining  should  dominate  at  lower  levels  of  a  negotiation.  More 
specialized actors should also share expertise and a common view of a problem (Panke 
2006: 366), further strengthening this expectation. The lower degree of transparency of 
lower  level  discussions  (reducing  the  need  for  posturing),  the  higher  degree  of 
technicality,  and  the  lower  degree  of  politicization  should  all  push  into  the  same 
direction. Equally, at the highest level – heads of state or government in the European 
Council – soft bargaining should predominate as this forum is already conceptualized to 
resolve problems that could not be  settled at a lower level.  However,  there is also  a 
reason  to  question  this  hypothesis:  in  general,  representatives  may  be  more  prone  to 
engage  in  contentious  bargaining  than  individuals  negotiating  for  themselves  (Pruitt 
1983: 175). The more restricted the mandate of negotiators, moreover, the easier it should 
be  for  them  to  end  up  with  hard  bargaining.  As  put  by  Metcalfe  (1998:  425),  the 
alternative hypothesis then is: “Officials in working parties may be obliged to bargain 
harder  than  would  ministers  on  the  same  issue”.  Leaving  the  task  of  discriminating 17
between these two hypotheses to empirical research, for the moment our expectation for 
the budget negotiations derived from this hypothesis is for ministers in the Council to opt 
for more conflictive tactics than both the experts in the working groups and the heads of 
state and government. 
5 Tactics in the Negotiations over the Financial Perspective, 2007-2013
The previous section has showed that several hypotheses can be thought off to explain 
variation in the strategies adopted in intergovernmental negotiations in the EU (see Table 
2).  In  the  following,  concentrating  on  hypotheses  1-6,  which  predict  variation  across
countries,  we  carry  out  a  very  preliminary  empirical  examination  of  strategies  in  the 






Hard bargaining Soft bargaining
H1 Power resources France, Germany, Great Britain 
(to a lesser extent Italy) 
Rest
H2 BATNA Net contributors (particularly, 
Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, and Sweden)
Net beneficiaries




Portugal (until February 2005), 
and Germany and Poland (until 
September 2005)
Rest
H5 Public opinion Austria, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, Sweden, and 
Great Britain (and to a lesser 
extent Cyprus, France, the 
Netherlands, and Poland)
Rest
H6 Length of 
membership
New member states Old member states
H7 Phase of 
negotiation
Middle phase (most of 2005) Beginning (2004) and 
end game (June 2005;
December 2005)
H8 Level of 
negotiation
Council of Ministers Council working groups 
and European Council18
negotiations  for  the  Financial  Perspective,  2007-2013.  The  research is  by  no  means 
conclusive, and solely aims at exploring the usefulness of the approach sketched out so 
far for empirical research. Alas, for some countries  the expectations derived from the 
various hypotheses are contradictory, making even preliminary empirical research tricky 
(see Table 3 at the end of the paper). We try to overcome this problem by concentrating
on countries for which one expectation clearly dominates. In selecting cases, we were 
also eager to have variation with respect to the main independent variables singled out 
above: small versus large, net payer versus net beneficiary, winner versus loser, strong 
versus weak government, Euro-sceptical versus pro-European population, and new versus 
old member state. We excluded countries that held the presidency during 2005, since 
holding this office should influence a country’s approach to the negotiations independent 
of the hypotheses presented. Four countries fit these various conditions particularly well: 
Germany, Ireland, Poland and Spain. With variation on the independent variables, the 
predictions  for  whether  they  should  rely  on  hard  or  soft  bargaining  also  differ:  the 
expectation is for Ireland and Spain to have relied on soft bargaining, and Poland and 
Germany  to  have  employed hard  bargaining  tactics,  at  least  until  the  change  in 
governments in September 2005. 
5.1 Ireland
As a small country that is a net recipient, one of the older member states of the EU, and 
that  has  a  largely  Euro-friendly  population,  the  expectation  derived  from  the  above 
hypotheses is for Ireland to have largely relied on soft tactics. This expectation is not 
significantly  undermined  by  the  fact  that  Ireland  had  to  expect  losses  from  the  new 
financial framework, as over time it would lose its status of net recipient. Ireland’s EU 19
Commissioner  for  Health  and  Consumer  Protection,  David  Byrne,  confirms  this 
prediction well when stating: “It must be in Ireland’s interest to be more on the generous 
side than not” (quoted in Irish Times, 11 February 2004: 21).
Indeed, throughout the negotiations the Irish government largely relied on soft 
bargaining  tactics.  Rather  than  starting  out  with  a  high  opening  demand,  the  Irish 
government  showed  itself  to  be  flexible  from  the  beginning.  It  did  not  even  state  a 
position when the Commission put forward its proposals in early 2004, a tactic that may 
have been influenced more by the fact that Ireland held the presidency in the first half of 
2004  than  the  logic  set  out  above,  however.  The  Irish  government  also  signalled 
flexibility when accepting the proposals put forward by the Luxembourg presidency in 
June 2005, although these proposals signified substantial cuts in the payments going to 
Ireland.  This  soft  bargaining  approach  by  Ireland  was  evident  enough  for  the  Prime 
Minister of Luxembourg, Juncker, to single out Ireland as a model for all other member 
states (Agence Europe, 16 June 2004: 8). Even after the breakdown of the negotiations 
during  the  European  Council  of  June  2005,  the  Irish  Prime  Minister  Bertie  Ahern 
refrained from publicly criticizing Blair, who had to carry the blame for the deadlock in 
the negotiations. Ahern’s conciliatory statement – “I hate to seen grown men bickering” 
(Irish Independent, 18 June 2005) – stood in stark contrast to the statements made by 
other  governments,  with  the  French  President  Jacques  Chirac  calling  Blair’s  stance 
“pathetic” (Sunday Times, 19 June 2005). 
This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  Ireland  relied  only  on  soft  tactics.  Most 
importantly, its defensive coalition with France – which also encompassed a series of 
other countries – to protect the 2002 compromise on agricultural spending can be viewed 20
as hard bargaining. The Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dermot Ahern, made use of 
this defensive coalition to push Irish interests when stating: “We have strong support for 
our position from France and other countries” (quoted in Irish Times, 17 June 2005: 14). 
The agricultural issue was even defined as a “national interest” (Irish Times, 17 June 
2005: 14), on which Ireland would not accept a compromise. This issue-specific hard 
bargaining could indicate support for Hypothesis 3 that stresses the importance of loss 
aversion in shaping negotiation tactics. Moreover, Ireland was part of the  “friends of 
cohesion” group, which brought together 17 countries in defence of the EU’s cohesion 
policy. There is also some indication that the Irish foreign minister was more inclined to 
engage in hard bargaining than the prime minister (as expected based on hypothesis 8). In 
the  end  game  of  the  negotiations,  the  former  clearly  criticized  the  position  of  Great 
Britain,  calling  the  debates  “a  waste  of  time” as  long  as “the  elephant  in  the  corner 
(Britain)  hasn’t  moved”  (quoted  in  UPI,  25  November  2005).  In  short,  although  as 
expected  soft  bargaining  dominated  in  the  case  of  Ireland,  in  some  cases  the  Irish 
government employed hard bargaining tactics. 
5.2 Spain
Spain is a medium sized country with a generally Euro-friendly population, as witnessed 
by the success of the referendum on the Constitutional Treaty. It has been in the EU for 
two decades, and was one the largest net recipients in the previous financial framework of 
the EU. With only one factor pushing in the other direction – namely the fact that Spain
would have to accept losses in the negotiations –, the expectation is for Spain to have 
assumed a soft approach. This expectation is not borne out, however. Although the initial 
Commission  proposal  was  actually  quite  favourable  to  Spain  (Torreblanca  2005:  19), 21
with spending on structural and cohesion funds from which Spain benefited to increase 
substantially  as  compared  to  the  financial  framework  for  2000-2006,  the  Spanish 
government  immediately  qualified  it  as  “unacceptable”.  Throughout  the  following 
negotiations, it aggressively defended the position that it should receive structural funds 
for a sustained period of time, and that it could not become a net contributor before 2013. 
This position was considered as “digging-in” by observers (Missiroli 2005: 3).
To defend its position on the issue of structural funds, the Spanish tactic was to 
talk about the “Spanish problem”, which was defined as avoiding that Spain would be 
asked to pay the highest price for enlargement. The Spanish government was also eager 
to establish a defensive coalition. It was one of the drivers of the so-called “friends of 
cohesion”  group,  which  brought  together  17  countries  that  wanted  to  maintain  EU 
spending at a level of 1.14 percent of GNI to permit for generous structural funds. Rather 
than signalling flexibility on that issue, in June 2005 Spain was one of only five countries 
that opposed the proposals by the Luxembourg presidency (together with Finland, the 
Netherlands,  Sweden,  and  the  United  Kingdom).  It  upheld  this  stance  although  the 
Luxembourg presidency had offered an exceptional rule of another two years of structural 
funds  to  Spain  (admittedly,  the  proposals  were  less  generous  than  those  of  the 
Commission).  During  the  British  presidency,  Spain  continued  to  engage  in  hard 
bargaining.  When  the  British  presidency  presented  its  first  proposal,  the  Spanish 
government, in the form of Alberto Navarro, Spanish Secretary of State for European 
Affairs, again qualified it as “unacceptable” (Agence Europe, 8 December 2005: 6).
Only  in  the  end  game  of  the  negotiations  did  the  Spanish  approach  to  the 
negotiations change slightly. In early December, for example, the Spanish Minister of 22
Economics and Vice-President, Pedro Solbes, ruled out the use of a veto when stating 
that  “this  is  not  the  moment  of  vetoes”  (El  País,  6  December  2005:  3).  Spain  also 
immediately announced support for the German proposals for compromise announced 
shortly before the December 2005 European Council. Overall, however, contrary to the 
expectation derived from the hypotheses set out above, the observations indicate that 
Spain  mainly  employed  hard  bargaining  tactics  in  the  negotiations  for  the  financial 
framework 2007-13.
5.3 Poland
With  its  highly  Euro-sceptical  population  and  weak  government,  we  expect  the  new 
member country Poland to have relied more on hard bargaining tactics than Ireland and 
Spain,  at  least  until  the  elections  in  September  2005,  when  the  party  in  government 
experienced a crushing defeat. This expectation is only slightly attenuated by the fact that 
Poland could expect to be one of the main beneficiaries from a successful conclusion of 
the negotiations. The expectation of Polish hard bargaining is clearly borne out by the 
available evidence, with Poland relying on practically all of the hard bargaining tactics 
set  out  above.  It  joined  a  defensive  coalition  encompassing  among  others  Belgium, 
Cyprus,  France,  and  Ireland  on  the  issue  of  agricultural  spending  (Agence  Europe,  8 
November  2005:  8).  It  also  vigorously  defended  the  EU’s  cohesion  policy.  The  hard 
bargaining  tactics  were  used  particularly  after  the  rejection  by  some  old  member 
countries of the compromise proposals tabled by the Luxembourg presidency in June 
2005, which had been relatively favourable to the interests of the new EU members. In 
the  following  months,  together  with  the  other  Visegrád  countries  (Czech  Republic, 
Hungary, and Slovakia), Poland insisted that future proposals should be close to those 23
that they had accepted in June 2005 (Agence Europe, 17 September 2005: 4). Throughout 
the British presidency, moreover, it emphasized that even if it was interested in a rapid
agreement (as stressed by Hypothesis 2), it would not move from its position (Agence 
Europe, 13 October 2005: 9). 
Both the Polish prime minister and the foreign minister used hard tactics in the 
run-up to the meeting of the European Council in December 2005. The prime minister, 
for example, dubbed the British proposals from 5 December as “unacceptable” (Agence 
Europe,  7  December  2005:  9).  In  another  statement,  he  called  the  British  proposals 
“fake”,  leading  the  Economist  to  conclude  that  Poland  was  the  harshest  critic  of  the 
presidency’s  proposals  (Economist  online  edition,  19  December  2005).  The  prime 
minister also called the second British proposal “in no way satisfactory” and threatened 
with a Polish veto if the plan was not changed (Financial Times, 15 December 2005: 1; 
see also El País, 15 December 2005: 3). Similarly, the Polish foreign minister, Stefan 
Meller, strongly criticized the British proposals. On 15 December, he and his French 
counterpart  used  a  particular  hard  bargaining  tactic  to  make  their  case:  they  jointly 
published a letter in the Financial Times (15 December 2005: 18), in which they argued 
that  the  presidency’s  proposals  could  not  “become  the  basis  of  an  agreement”.  They
pushed Great Britain to make concessions, and even threatened to use a veto if their 
demands  were  not  met.  They  contrasted  the  British  intransigence  with  their  own 
willingness to make compromises, as illustrated by their acceptance of the Luxembourg 
proposals  in  June.  On  the  soft  bargaining  side,  they  emphasized  their  continued 
willingness to make concessions “provided that all of us make a similar effort”.24
The Polish bargaining tactics remained on the aggressive side during the final
meeting of the European Council. This led British officials to state that Poland proved “a 
hard  nut  to  crack”  (Financial  Times,  5  December  2005:  2).  It  was  one  of  only  two 
countries to explicitly make use of veto threats during the European Council (the other 
was Italy), with Poland being the more prominent one as it “constantly” referred to its 
veto power (Agence Europe, 19 December 2005: 2). In short, Poland largely relied on 
hard bargaining tactics. This is in line with the expectation derived from the hypotheses 
set out in the previous section.
5.4 Germany
The hypotheses outlined above lead to the expectation that Germany should have mainly 
relied on hard bargaining tactics, at least until the elections in September 2005. As a large 
country, which is a sizeable net contributor to the EU’s budget, and whose government 
had to face elections at a time when opinion polls predicted low levels of support for the 
main government party, Germany is nearly the ideal case (besides the United Kingdom) 
of a country that should have relied on hard bargaining tactics. In fact, Germany started 
into  the  negotiations  with  a  high  opening  demand.  As  early  as  November  2003,  the 
German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder warned his colleagues that Germany “should not 
be overburdened” (quoted in Reuters, 5 November 2003). The same talk also included a 
hardly  disguised  threat  against  Poland  and  Spain,  the  two  countries  that  at  that  time 
blocked the negotiations on a Constitutional Treaty for the EU. Schröder stated that those
governments  (meaning  Poland  and  Spain)  that  did  not  see  the  link  between  the 
Intergovernmental Conference and the negotiations for the Financial Perspective would 
“have to learn that you cannot neglect such aspects and go unpunished”. This threat came 25
just  days  after  demonstrations  in  Germany  against  Schröder’s  domestic  policies,  an 
indication that the logic captured by hypothesis 4 (government weakness) may have been 
at play.
One month later, Germany was one of six net contributing countries that sent a 
letter to Commission President Prodi, demanding that the EU’s budget should not exceed 
1 percent of the EU’s combined GNI. This was a high opening demand as the ceiling in 
the previous multi-annual financial perspective (2000-2006) had stood at 1.08 percent of 
GNI. Schröder was also put under pressure on that issue by one of the leaders of the 
opposition, Edmund Stoiber, who in January 2004 stated that Germany could not increase 
its  contribution  to  the  EU  budget  (EUObserver,  6  January  2004).  In  2005,  this 
competition  with  the  opposition  became  even  more  important  in  shaping  the 
government’s tactics in the negotiations, leading observers to predict that Schröder would 
not be willing to compromise before the elections (EUObserver, 27 May 2005). In that 
stage, hard bargaining was mainly visible in German criticism of the British rebate. In 
March 2005, the German government even joined with the Netherlands and Sweden to 
write a so-called “non paper” that attacked the British budget rebate and maintained that
the net contribution of the signing countries had to be reduced (Agence Europe, 12 March 
2005:  8).  Britain  was  not  the  only  one  to  receive  sharp  criticisms  from  Germany, 
however: Spain’s insistence on continued payment of structural funds to its regions was 
also constantly slated by the German government. In May 2005, for example, Germany
(together with four other countries) explicitly criticized the proposals by the Luxembourg 
presidency  to  prolong  payments  of  structural  funds  to  Spain  by  two  years  (Agence 26
Europe, 12 May 2005: 3). At the same time, Germany entered into a defensive coalition 
with France to maintain the level of agricultural spending (EUObserver, 6 June 2005). 
Against the expectation derived from the hypotheses set out above (although in 
line with hypothesis 8), however, Schröder was quite conciliatory just before and during 
the  European  Council  of  June  2005  (Agence  Europe,  4  June  2005:  4).  After  having 
insisted on the 1 percent of GNI limit for the last one and a half years, in June Schröder
suddenly announced that Germany would accept a “constructive compromise” on that 
issue (Agence Europe, 11 June 2005: 9). Basically, this signalled to other countries that 
Germany was willing to pay more into the budget to finance enlargement, as long as 
other countries would also yield. After the breakdown of the summit, Germany again 
assumed  a  more  aggressive  stance.  Schröder  talked  about  the  “totally  unacceptable 
attitude” (UPI, 20 June 2005) and the “stubbornness” (Sunday Times, 19 June 2005) of 
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands in rejecting the compromise proposal that had 
been on the table. This response was much more critical of the United Kingdom than the 
one by the Irish government (Sunday Times, 19 June 2005), an observation that supports 
our predictions. The German government also returned to public commitments of not 
giving in: after the elections but still before the new government was in place, it repeated 
that it could not make a larger contribution to the EU budget than in the previous multi-
annual framework (Agence Europe, 28 October 2005 : 5). Together with three other net 
contributors (Austria, the Netherlands, and Sweden), it also insisted on the correction of 
disequilibria in contributions to the EU budget.
The tone significantly changed with the new government in place, however. The 
new German foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, welcomed the British proposals 27
of 5 December as an “acceptable working basis” (Agence Europe, 8 December 2005: 6). 
The new Chancellor, Angela Merkel, also was far less outspoken than her predecessor. In 
a press conference, she explicitly abstained from talking about the British rebate or any 
other  particular  issue  in  the  negotiations,  stating  that  she  did  so  to  facilitate  later 
compromises  (Associated  Press  Worldstream  –  German,  8  December  2005).  More 
significantly, just before the European Council, Germany made a decisive proposal that 
allowed for the conclusion of the negotiations (Szemlér 2006: 13). In the end, Germany 
yielded to allow for a compromise, making it the biggest net contributor relative to Gross 
Domestic Product.
6 Conclusion
The aim of this paper has been to analyze whether there is systematic variation in the 
bargaining  tactics  used  by  different  member  countries  in  EU  intergovernmental 
negotiations, and if yes, how the observable variation can be explained. We have set out a 
number of hypotheses, before exploring the plausibility of some of these hypotheses in a 
study  of  the  strategies  used by  four  countries  in  the  negotiations  for  the  Financial 
Perspective 2007-2013. The empirical examination has confirmed that there is variation 
across countries in the bargaining tactics employed: Ireland relied more on soft tactics 
than the other three countries. Moreover, three of the exploratory case studies supported 
the  expectations  derived  from  the  hypotheses.  Finally,  when  elaborating  these  case 
studies,  within-case  analysis  has  given  indications  of  the  working  of  specific  causal 
factors delineated in the theoretical part. For example, the elections in Germany clearly 
seem  to  have  had  an  influence  on  Germany’s  approach  to  the  budget  negotiations 
(supporting hypothesis 4).28
The preliminary analysis has also unearthed several challenges, however, which 
we will have to tackle in further research on this topic. First, the case of Spain did not 
match expectations: that country’s government relied far more on hard bargaining than 
we had predicted. This deviant finding may result from the assumption that we made in 
this paper that the individual hypotheses have approximately equal causal weight (thus 
neglecting the possibility that one factor that leads to the prediction of hard bargaining 
may outweigh several other factors that push in the other direction). In future research, 
we will resolve this problem by selecting cases that allow for tests of each hypothesis
individually. Second, it has become apparent that the fact that countries have to react to 
proposals made either by  the Commission or the Presidency is a confounding factor: 
since these proposals are not equally favourable to all member countries, some countries 
will  be  pushed  to  react  more  harshly  than  others,  simply  as  a  result  of  a  lack  of 
coincidence between their preferences and the proposals on the table. Third, so far we 
have ignored the strategic aspect of choosing a tactic: the choice of a specific tactic may 
be a response to the use of a specific tactic by another party. Finally, as this research 
progresses, we will have to make sure that the variation that can be seen in the choice of 
tactics is not driven by idiosyncratic factors, namely the  different personalities of the 
people involved. Despite these caveats, we think that systematic research along the lines 
set  out  in  this  paper  may  provide  interesting  new  insights  into  intergovernmental 
bargaining in the EU.
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